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This article examines the question whether civil claimants could be legally entitled to receive 
apologies from the perspective of a civil law jurisdiction, taking the Netherlands as an example. 
I  INTRODUCTION
In several countries, court-ordered apologies are available as a civil legal 
remedy, albeit not a common one. In Japan, where apologies play an important 
role in the resolution of conflicts, courts can order written, public apologies in 
cases of defamation.1 The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (China’s Civil Code) provides that in China, one of the main 
methods of bearing civil liability is the extension of apology.2 Under Australian 
anti-discrimination legislation, the apology order is available as a remedy for 
discrimination and other unlawful conduct.3 In her article ‘Apologies as a legal 
remedy’,4 Robyn Carroll demonstrates that apologies have an established remedial 
role in several areas of Australian law. She sums up a diversity of circumstances in 
*  VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Law, Amsterdam Centre for Comprehensive Law.
1  Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation , 
(2000) 48 Cleveland State Law Review, 545, 558. 
2 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 134, 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?LookType=3&Lib=law&Cgid=2
780&Id=1165&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=&paycode=. See also Nicola Brutti, 
‘Legal Narratives and Compensation Trends in Tort Law: The Case of Public Apology’, 
(2013) 24 European Business Law Review, 127, 132, n 36. 
3 Robyn Carroll, ‘The Ordered ‘Apology’ as a Remedy Under Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation in Australia: an Exercise in Futility?’, in Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgements, (Presses Universitaires D’Aix-Marseille 2010) 362. Other countries in which 
court-ordered apologies are a civil legal remedy are, for example,  Indonesia, Ukraine, 
Korea (see Brent T White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights 
Remedy, (2006) 91 Cornell Law Review, 1261, n 2),  Vietnam (see Brutti, above n 2, 
133), Slovakia, Russia, Turkey and Poland (see below Section III(B)). White notes that 
information on other countries is not really available. Brutti (Brutti, above n 2, 131-2) 
mentions that the main usage of legal apologies is represented by far eastern countries 
and that court-ordered apologies are less common as a civil legal remedy in western legal 
systems such as the United States, the United Kingdom and other European countries.  
4 Robyn Carroll, ‘Apologies as a Legal Remedy’, (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review, 317.
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which apologies are available as a civil legal remedy in Australian law. Apology 
orders are, in the first place, available as a remedy where power to make such an 
order is conferred by statute. Furthermore, a court exercising equitable jurisdiction 
has the power to order an apology as a form of specific relief.5 
Although court-ordered apologies have a long history in the Netherlands and 
in other civil law jurisdictions, apologies are no longer explicitly included as a 
remedy in the current Dutch Civil Code. Yet there is increasing awareness that 
apologies can be very important to people who suffered a wrong. As elsewhere, 
multiple legal and practical objections surround compelling wrongdoers to make 
apologies. This article examines the question whether claimants could be legally 
entitled to receive apologies from the perspective of a civil law jurisdiction, 
taking the Dutch system as an example. Occasionally there will be referred to 
the Australian system to compare with in order to clarify the situation in civil law 
jurisdictions. Section II provides a short overview of the history and disappearance 
of apologies as a civil legal remedy in the Netherlands and Continental Europe. 
It will be argued that, although apologies are no longer explicitly included as a 
remedy in the current Dutch Civil Code, there seem to be no fundamental legal 
barriers for a claimant requesting an apology. Several possible legal grounds for 
a duty to offer apologies can be identified in Dutch law. In section III it will be 
explained that the enforcement of the obligation to offer apologies is the most 
problematic. An often-made objection against compelled apologies is that they 
constitute an infringement of the right to freedom of expression, but it will be 
submitted that this fundamental right in some specific situations may yield to 
the rights of plaintiffs. Finally, section IV examines the objection that compelled 
apologies are insincere and therefore of no or limited value. 
II  COMPELLED APOLOGIES IN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: 
PAST AND PRESENT
(a) From Amende Honorable to Rectification
Until 1992, apologies were available as a remedy in the Dutch Civil Code. In the 
case of defamation or derision, the claimant could request the court to declare 
that the defendant had acted in a defamatory or derisive manner.6 To prevent the 
judgment being publicly posted, the defendant could choose to make a public 
statement in court instead. With this public statement, the defendant was required 
to openly exhibit remorse.7 This law originated from the ius commune era – 
roughly the period from the reception of Roman Law until the codifications of 
the 19th century – which formed the basis of a common system of legal thought 
in Continental Europe. The so-called amende honorable – as contrasted to 
the amende profitable, making amends by way of damages – was  one of the 
5 Ibid 347-8.
6 Burgerlijk Wetboek 1838 (The Netherlands) [Civil Code 1838], Article 1409.
7 Burgerlijk Wetboek 1838 (The Netherlands) [Civil Code 1838], Article 1410.
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remedies available to the victim of insult.8 The amende honorable combined three 
originally separated elements. Firstly, with the declaration honoris the defendant 
formally declared that they had made the insult in anger and without the intention 
to assault the victim. Secondly, there was the palinodia, the dominant element 
of the three. In order to repair the victim’s honour, the defendant was obliged to 
retract his defamatory words, by stating those as being untrue. The third element 
of the amende honorable was an acknowledgement by the defender that they had 
acted wrong, combined with a prayer, asking for forgiveness. This deprecatio 
Christiana originated in the teachings of the Christian Church.9 
In 1838, the first Dutch Civil Code entered into force.10 By that time, the amende 
honorable had fallen into disuse. Courts particularly resented enforcing the 
amende honorable through imprisonment, being the only way in which it could 
be enforced. The Dutch legislator thus searched for an alternative. At that time, it 
was considered more important to obtain satisfaction for outraged honour than to 
award claimants an amount in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Hence, 
publicly posting, at the defendant’s expense, of a judgment declaring that the 
defendant had acted in a defamatory manner seemed to be a suitable remedy.11 
Later this remedy fell into disuse as well. From the 1960s onward, courts started 
ordering publication of rectifications, for example in newspapers, in defamation 
cases. This change is probably linked with the rise of the mass media. As 
defamation typically occurred through the media, a rectification published in the 
same media became the obvious remedy. As a consequence, publicly posting a 
judgment declaring that a defendant had acted in defamatory manner and, with 
that, court-ordered apologies, faded out of practice.12 Thirty years later, in 1992, 
the Dutch Civil Code changed significantly and one of those changes was the 
removal of the provision on apologies. 
(b) Current Situation
In civil law systems, the dominant line of legal reasoning is from substantive law 
to possible remedies. It could be argued that this is not really different in common 
law systems, according to the maxim ‘for every right, there is a remedy’. Yet 
the second part of that maxim ‘where there is no remedy, there is no right’ does 
not fit very well into civil law thinking, which easily allows for certain rights or 
entitlements not to have remedies.13 
8 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition, (Oxford University Press 1996) 1072.
9 Ibid.
10 Before 1838 the French Code Napoleon had been in force in the Netherlands from 1811. 
11 C J J C van Nispen, Het Rechterlijk Verbod en Bevel [Judicial Prohibition and Order] (PhD 
Theses, University of Leiden, 1978) 93-4.
12 Marjolijn Bulk, Rectificatie en Uitingsvrijheid: een Onderzoek naar de Civielrechtelijke 
Aansprakelijkheid voor Onrechtmatige Uitingen [Rectification and Freedom of Speech: 
a Study Concerned with Civil Liability for Tortious Speech] (PhD Theses, University of 
Amsterdam, 1998) 121. 
13 On (perceived) differences between common law and civil law systems, see K Zweigert 
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Apology orders are available as a remedy for civil wrongdoing in Australia. The 
power to order an apology could, for example, be conferred by statute upon a court, 
and apology orders may also be available as an equitable remedy.14 A concept like 
“the law of remedies” is not self-evident for a lawyer in a civil law jurisdiction. 
Although the removal of apologies as a remedy from the Dutch Civil Code could 
certainly support the argument that such remedy is no longer available, this 
conclusion is by no means unavoidable. Several possible legal grounds, which 
will be examined in the third part of this section, can still be identified for a duty 
to offer apologies. 
1  Sufficient Interest 
In Australia, a plaintiff who initiates legal proceedings is required to have 
“standing” to make a claim. The plaintiff must have “real interest” in the matter 
concerned.15 It is conceivable that a court order to apologise will be refused 
because the plaintiff has no standing. Furthermore, a court exercising equitable 
jurisdiction has, among other things, discretion to deny a judicial order on 
the ground that the relief would be futile. An order could be futile ‘when it is 
unable to protect the rights of the plaintiff’.16 This might be the case when an 
injunction could no longer protect the subject matter of the claim. An order might 
also be unable to protect the rights of the plaintiff when the defendant is unable 
or unwilling to comply with the relief applied for, or when it is not possible to 
effectively enforce the defendant’s compliance with the order.17 Hence, not only a 
lack of standing, but also the concept of futility might stand in the way: Carroll and 
Witzleb mention that some Australian courts ‘have taken the view that an apology 
that the defendant does not offer voluntarily will be insincere, meaningless and 
therefore futile’.18 
In Dutch law, a general requirement for any claim to be asserted at law is that one 
should have “sufficient interest”. This requirement might – to some extent – be 
compared to the concept of “standing”. The requirement of “sufficient interest”, 
can be found in Article 3:303 of the Dutch Civil Code and, is considered to be 
self-evident. One should not be allowed to bother ones fellow citizen, let alone the 
and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir trans Clarendon Press 3rd ed, 
1998).
14 Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, above n 4, 321. 
15 Christine M Forster and Vedna Jivan, Public Interest Litigation and Human Rights 
Implementation: The Indian and Australian Experience, (2008) 3 Asian Journal of 
Comparative Law, 1, 10.
16 Normann Witzleb, ‘Equity Does Not Act in Vain’: An Analysis of Futility Arguments in 
Claims for Injunctions’, (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review, 503, 505. 
17 Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, above n 4, 321.
18 Robyn Carroll and Norman Witzleb, ‘It’s Not Just about the Money’- Enhancing the 
Vindicatory Effect of Private Law Remedies’, (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review, 
216, 232. Carroll and Witzleb refer to Evans v National Crime Authority [2003] FMCA 
375, [115]; Jones v Toben (2002) 71 ALD 629, [106], citing Hely ‘s decision in Jones v 
Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243, [245]. 
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courts, with legal contentions of any kind if the interest at stake is not serious. Yet, 
as even the smallest pecuniary interest is considered to be sufficient, fulfilment 
of the requirement of “sufficient interest” is very seldom questioned. However, 
in 1998, when the Dutch Supreme Court gave judgment in the Jeffrey case19, a 
discussion about the fulfilment of this requirement erupted among lawyers and 
academics. 
The tragic death of a three-year-old boy called Jeffrey gave rise to this judgement. 
After swim therapy at an university hospital, Jeffrey’s mother and the swimming 
therapist both lost sight of the child. They found him some time later, lying 
unconscious in the swimming pool. Jeffrey passed away twelve days later. 
Jeffrey’s parents claimed the swimming therapist was responsible for their son’s 
dead. They blamed her for not searching the swimming pool thoroughly the 
moment she had found out that Jeffrey was not in the shower, where he was 
supposed to be. Furthermore they blamed both the therapist and the hospital for 
not blocking the access to the swimming pool and for not lowering the water 
level after the therapy. The hospital did not acknowledge responsibility. In the 
following civil proceedings, Jeffrey’s parents asked the court for a declaratory 
judgment that the hospital was liable for what had happened. At the stage the case 
reached the Supreme Court, no damages were at stake. The few compensable 
heads of damage Dutch liability law allows for in these circumstances, were 
either already compensated by the parent’s first party insurance, or considered 
insufficiently substantiated and therefore stricken out in the previous instances. 
The parents argued that to them a ruling of the court confirming the liability (in 
the form of a declaratory judgment) of the hospital was a prerequisite to come to 
terms with Jeffrey’s death.20 
The Supreme Court declined the parent’s request for a declaratory judgment, 
ruling that their interest at stake was purely emotional and did not fulfil the 
requirement of “sufficient interest”.21 The case was received very badly. It led 
to a heated debate about what interests could and should be within the ambit 
of the law. Scholarly opinion generally rejected the Supreme Court’s position.22 
Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to reconsider its 
position, the issue has remained controversial until the present day. 
19 Dutch Supreme Court, 9 October 1998, NJ 1998, 853.
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.
22 See, eg, E G van Maanen, ‘Een arrest dat shockeert: HR 9 oktober 1998’ [A Shocking 
Judgment: Dutch Supreme Court 9 October 1998], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk 
Recht 1999/2, 47; C C van Dam, ‘Emotioneel belang en affectieschade’ [Emotional Interest 
and Damages for the Non-Pecuniary Loss of Relatives], Verkeersrecht Artikelen 2000, 73; 
L F Wiggers-Rust, ‘Jaarvergadering Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht 1999: Gaat het in 
het Burgerlijk Recht alleen om geld?’ [Annual Meeting Netherlands Association of Civil 
Law 1999: Is It Just about Money in Civil Law?], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk 
Recht 2000/4, 150. Contra B W M  Nieskens-Isphording, ‘Het vermogensrecht, de Hoge 
Raad en de emoties van Van Maanen’ [Property Law, the Dutch Supreme Court and Van 
Maanen’s emotions], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 1999/5.   
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One could argue that, given the Jeffrey case, asking a court order to offer an 
apology could, under Dutch law, be considered to serve a purely emotional 
interest, and could therefore fail to fulfil the requirement of “sufficient interest”. 
It should be noted however, that the facts on which the Jeffrey case was decided 
were very peculiar indeed. There is really no reason why a plaintiff requesting 
an order to offer apologies would frame this claim exclusively as a request for 
a declaratory judgment. It could even be argued that the Jeffrey case resulted 
from professional negligence on the part of the plaintiffs’ lawyer. A properly 
substantiated claim for damages for the smallest amount of financial loss, or for 
rectification as mentioned in the Civil Code, would suffice to constitute “sufficient 
interest”. It seems very hard to image a case where the facts would not allow such 
additional claim to be put forward.23 As fundamental as the Jeffrey case might 
seem from the point of view of principle, its practical consequences are probably 
very small or even non-existent.  
2  Awareness of the Importance of Non-Pecuniary Interests
Carroll notes that, although apologies are unsuitable as a legal remedy ‘in the 
eyes of many’, there has been growing attention paid in Australian law to the 
importance of apologies.24 In the Netherlands, the Jeffrey case can illustrate 
the strong focus of present day civil law on interests with a tangible pecuniary 
dimension, such as the right to claim damages, the right to performance and the 
regulation of property. This is despite the fact that the Netherlands, as well as 
other civil law jurisdictions, embraces the principle of restitutio ad integrum: 
restoration to the original position.25 In tort cases this means to return the injured 
party as near as possible to the situation that would have existed had no harm been 
inflicted. Hence recovery takes precedence over monetary compensation. Yet 
as in many other countries, there is an increasing awareness in the Netherlands 
that non-pecuniary interests, such as emotional recovery, the confirmation of 
responsibility and all kinds of other forms of “acknowledgment”, preventing the 
same thing from happening to others, and, indeed, apologies, can be of great or 
even overriding importance to plaintiffs, for instance to victims of personal injury. 
Being confined to the sphere of morality for what in hindsight might appear to 
have been a relatively short period of time, apologies seem also to be gradually 
entering again into the sphere of the law. Perhaps the most obvious example of this 
can be found in the field of adverse medical events. As in many other countries, 
efforts have been made in recent years to encourage health care professionals to 
make disclosure and offer apologies in an appropriate way following an adverse 
23 A J Akkermans et al, ‘Excuses in het Privaatrecht’ [Apologies in Civil Law], WPNR 
2008/6772, 778, 779.
24 Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, above n 4, 317.
25 A S Hartkamp and C H Sieburgh, Mr. C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening 
van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht. 6. Verbintenissenrecht. Deel III. Algemeen 
Overeenkomstenrecht [Mr. C. Asser’s Handbook to the Practise of Dutch Civil Law. 6. The 
Law of Obligations. Part III. General Contract Law] (Kluwer, 2012), [31].
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medical event.26 This has reached the stage at which failing to do so is clearly 
contrary to the applicable professional standard. Health care professionals who 
fail to be open and apologise to patients will be disciplined for misconduct by 
disciplinary tribunals.27
In the Netherlands, the “professional standard” of physicians and other health 
care professionals is laid down in various guidelines and codes of conduct. The 
professional organization of physicians in the Netherlands, the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association (“Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering 
der Geneeskunst”, KNMG), seeks to maintain the quality of professional practice 
and public health. In 2007, the KNMG developed a guideline: ‘Dealing with 
incidents, mistakes and complaints: what can be expected of doctors?’ (‘Omgaan 
met incidenten, fouten en klachten: wat mag van artsen worden verwacht?’). This 
guideline emphasizes the importance and necessity for physicians to communicate 
openly with patients concerning medical negligence. In this guideline, it is 
stipulated that mistakes should be admitted and apologies should be offered. 
Furthermore, in 2010, the Personal Injury Council (“de Letselschade Raad”) 
introduced the ‘Code of conduct on open communication after medical incidents 
and better resolution of medical malpractice claims’, (‘Gedragscode Openheid 
medische incidenten; betere afwikkeling Medische Aansprakelijkheid, GOMA’). 
The GOMA provides a number of guidelines to improve communication and the 
resolution of medical malpractice claims. The GOMA encourages physicians 
to communicate openly about their mistakes and to offer their apologies. One 
of the GOMA recommendations explicitly states that when proper care was not 
provided, physicians should make apologies. In addition, it is emphasized that 
making an apology does not imply recognition of civil liability, as the latter is not 
a decision for the physician to make.  
A growing awareness that non-pecuniary interests can be of great importance 
to plaintiffs can also be noticed in the public sector, both in Australia and in 
the Netherlands. According to Carroll, a growing interest can be discerned in 
apologies as a form of redress in complaints against governmental institutions in 
Australia. Apologies are, for example, encouraged and recommended by way of 
resolving complaints made to ombudsman offices.28  
In 2009, The National Ombudsman of the Netherlands stressed that financial 
compensation alone is generally not enough: honest explanations and apologies 
are no less important than pecuniary compensation.29 The National Ombudsman 
26 Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, above n 4, 319.
27 Disciplinary tribunals can impose a number of disciplinary measures: a warning, reprimand, 
fine or temporary or permanent suspension from practice. See the website of the Dutch 
medical disciplinary tribunals (only in Dutch), http://www.tuchtcollege-gezondheidszorg.
nl/. 
28 Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, above n 4, 332.
29 A F M Brenninkmeijer, Apologies in Public Administration (2010)
 http://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/sites/default/files/jv_2009_apologies_in_public_
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guidelines on proper conduct determine that appropriate government action is: 
A. Open and clear
B. Respectful
C. Caring and solution focused
D. Fair and reliable30       
 
One of the guidelines specifically prescribes that, when mistakes have been made, 
public authorities should show leniency and flexibility. As a note is added that 
‘authorities should be prepared to admit their mistakes and to offer appropriate 
apologies’.31
Dutch health care professionals and public authorities who fail to admit their 
mistakes, communicate openly and apologise, act contrary to their professional 
guidelines and/or codes of conduct. The question remains as to whether they 
could actually be obliged to act in accordance with these guidelines and codes 
of conduct, hence, if they could possibly be obliged to offer apologies. In 2001, 
the Dutch Supreme Court gave judgment in the Thrombosis case.32 In this case, 
the Supreme Court explicitly held that, as part of his contractual rights towards 
his physician, a patient could claim his physician to act in accordance with his 
professional standard. Hence, when some protocol, professional guideline or 
code of conduct compels health care professionals to apologise, they might be 
considered to be obliged to do so as a matter of performance of their legal contract 
with their patients. The same probably applies to public authorities. Failing to 
offer apologies for a wrongful act might be a breach of the principle of sound 
administration.33 
3  General Legal Grounds
As mentioned, since 1992 apologies are no longer explicitly included as a remedy 
in the current Dutch Civil Code. However, it does not follow from this that such 
remedy is no longer available. As indicated above, Dutch health care professionals 
and public authorities could possibly be legally obliged to offer apologies. Also 
several possible general legal grounds can be identified for a possible duty to 
offer apologies. 
(i)  Specific Performance 
Typical for a civil law system is that specific performance is conceived as a 
primary remedy, and that there are no special requirements for injunctive relief. 
administration_-_engels_artikel.pdf.  
30 http://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/sites/default/files/guidelines_on_proper_conduct_
october_2012_2.pdf.
31 Ibid. 
32 HR 2 March 2001, NJ 2001, 649, note F C B van Wijmen and J B M Vranken.
33 Brenninkmeijer, above n 29, 11.
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The Dutch Civil Code’s provision on injunction reads: 
‘Unless it follows otherwise from the law, the nature of the obligation or 
a juridical act, the person obliged to give, to do or not to do something in 
regard to another, may be ordered to do so by the court upon the demand 
of the person to whom the obligation is owned.’34 
It is perfectly conceivable that a claim to receive an apology (‘to do something’) 
could be awarded by the court on the basis of this provision.35 As we have seen, 
public authorities and physicians can be obliged by applicable standards of conduct 
to offer apologies. Under certain circumstances, the same obligation might be 
construed for private parties.36 The only possible obstacle for injunctive relief in 
such cases seems to be that an order to offer apologies could be considered to be 
irreconcilable with ‘the nature of the obligation’. Apologies could be characterized 
as exclusively personal and enforcement thereof could be considered an undue 
interference with the personal freedom, especially the freedom of expression, 
of the defendant. Enforcement could also be considered to impair the value of 
the apology. One could reason that compelled apologies are, unlike voluntary 
apologies, insincere, and therefore without value. Such reasoning could perhaps 
be compared to the above-mentioned ‘futility’ argument of some Australian courts. 
Furthermore, it could be considered practically difficult or even impossible to 
force someone to apologise. These and other practical and legal obstacles will be 
examined in the next section. 
(ii)  The Obligation to Mitigate Damage
Formal apologies to citizens by public administrators could be a condition for 
reconciliation or may restore damaged relations.37 Also, victims of medical 
malpractice often experience a strong need to know more about what happened 
and what went wrong, and to receive apologies for any mistakes made. A 
physician who fails to be open about a medical incident and fails to offer an 
apology, ignores important non-pecuniary needs of his patient. It is imaginable 
that this patient’s recovery will be hampered or even that the physical and 
psychological consequences of the incident may worsen. This phenomenon 
is known as secondary victimization.38 It is therefore perfectly arguable that 
physicians and public authorities who fail to communicate openly and apologise, 
can be considered to be acting in breach of their obligation to mitigate damage.39 
34 Burgerlijk Wetboek (The Netherlands) [Civil Code], Article 3:296.
35 Akkermans et al, above n 23, 780.
36 E.g. where private parties have some kind of public responsibility.
37 Brenninkmeijer, above n 29, 2. 
38 A J Akkermans and K A P C van Wees, ‘Het letselschadeproces in therapeutisch perspectief’ 
[Personal Injury Claim Settlement  from a Therapeutic Point of View], Tijdschrift voor 
Vergoeding Personenschade 2007/4, 106.
39 J L Smeehuijzen, ‘Schadevergoeding wegens onzorgvuldige afwikkeling van 
letselschadevorderingen’ [Compensation for Negligent Resolution of Personal Injury 
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(iii) Compensation in kind
It is also quite conceivable that a court would order someone to offer apologies 
as a form of non-pecuniary compensation for breach of an obligation. Dutch law 
provides that the loss that has to be compensated in case of liability consists of 
both pecuniary losses and ‘other detriments’.40 Damages for pain and suffering 
can be awarded for instance if a person sustained personal injury or if his honour 
or reputation is injured.41 If so requested by the claimant, the court may also order 
compensation in kind instead of a pecuniary award.42 It is very well imaginable 
that the court would order someone to offer apologies as a form of non-pecuniary 
compensation for non-pecuniary harm on this basis.43 Of course, this option is only 
open when all other requirements for compensation are met. This entails certain 
limitations, e.g. when a medical mistake is made but it remains unclear whether 
damage has arisen, there is a wrong committed but no obligation to compensate 
exists. In that situation, a request to order an apology as a form of compensation 
in kind can of course not be granted.
(iv)  Reasonableness and Fairness
Article 6:2 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that parties to an obligation must 
behave towards each other in accordance to the requirements of reasonableness 
and fairness.44 The principles of reasonableness and fairness form another possible 
legal ground for a request for apologies. Under the proper circumstances, one 
could argue that these principles compel a party to offer apologies to the other 
party.45 This, however, does require that a pre-existing legal obligation of some sort 
between the parties is established, e.g. the obligation to pay damages, as doctrine 
deems obligations arising from the principles of reasonableness and fairness to be 
complementary only. These principles can’t call additional obligations into being 
where none exist already. 
III COMPELLED APOLOGIES AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
As we have seen above, several possible grounds can still be identified in Dutch 
law for a legal duty to offer apologies. Awareness is increasing that non-pecuniary 
interests can be of great importance to claimants. It seems to be much more the 
enforcement of the obligation to apologise, than the acceptance of this obligation 
as such that remains problematic – at least that is how it looks from the perspective 
Claims], NTBR 2009/44, 328. 
40 Burgerlijk Wetboek (The Netherlands) [Civil Code], Article 6:95.
41 Burgerlijk Wetboek (The Netherlands) [Civil Code], Article 6:106(1).
42 Burgerlijk Wetboek (The Netherlands) [Civil Code], Article 6:103.
43 Akkermans et al, above n 23, 780.
44 ‘Creditor and debtor must, as between themselves, act in accordance with the requirements 
of reasonableness and fairness.’ Burgerlijk Wetboek (The Netherlands) [Civil Code], 
Article 6:2(1). 
45 Akkermans et al, above n 23, 780.
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of a civil law system. 
A first and often-made objection against compelled apologies is that they would 
constitute an undue infringement of the right to freedom of expression. For 
example, in the Australian case Summertime Holdings Pty Ltd v Environmental 
Defender’s Office Ltd, Young J decided not to make an apology order, referring to 
the right to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights46.47  
The right to freedom of expression is also a fundamental right recognized in 
the European Convention on Human Rights48 (hereafter called the Convention). 
Article 1 of the Convention determines that all contracting states are obliged 
to directly secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of the Convention. The supervision thereof rests primarily 
with the national authorities, in particular the national courts. Individuals, groups 
of individuals and nongovernmental organizations claiming to be the victim of a 
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention by one of the contracting states, 
enjoy a right of action to assert these rights.49 When all efforts to resolve the 
dispute have been undertaken within the national legal order, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) has a role as secondary to the institutions of national 
legal systems in the adjudication of claims that there has been a violation of the 
Convention rights.50   
The right to freedom of expression is articulated in Article 10 (1) of the Convention. 
Everyone is free to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas. 
At first sight, an obligation to offer apologies to someone seems hard to reconcile 
with this fundamental right. It can be argued that apologies represent an opinion 
or an emotion, which nobody may be forced to express. However, under certain 
circumstances, Article 10 of the Convention permits restrictions on the right to 
freedom of expression. In several contracting states, infringements of this right in 
the form of apology orders have been made, usually in defamation proceedings, 
to protect the privacy or the reputation of the claimant.51 Plaintiffs are ordered to 
publish a rectification or retraction of untrue statements, containing apologies. In 
the next section, a number of Dutch and European cases concerning the connection 
between the right to freedom of expression and apologies will be discussed. 
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 99 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
47 (1998) 45 NSWLR 291 (Summertime Holdings). See also Carroll, Apologies as a Legal 
Remedy, above n 4, 326.
48 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
49 Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
50 Robin C A White and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 84.
51 For example Slovakia, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Poland. Below n 59. 
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(a) Compelled Apologies, Freedom of Expression and Dutch Courts
In cases of defamation, Dutch courts can order to publish a rectification on the 
basis of Article 6:167 of the Dutch Civil Code: 
‘Where (…) a person is liable towards another person on account of an 
incorrect or, by its incompleteness, misleading publication of information 
of a factual nature, the court may, upon the demand of such other person, 
order him to publish a correction in such manner as it determines.’
As this provision illustrates, a rectification is considered a correction of incorrect, 
incomplete or misleading factual information. It is not about changing an opinion 
or emotion. In order to infringe the freedom of expression as little as possible, 
courts generally try to formulate an ordered rectification in such way, that a 
clear-cut retraction of the defendant’s opinion is avoided. The text will read as 
factual as possible (‘the court has determined that so-and-so was incorrect’), 
the subjective position of the defendant preferably not explicitly addressed. In 
this particular light, it will come to no surprise that the prevailing view in the 
literature on rectification is that apologies cannot be ordered under Article 6:167.52 
Nevertheless, claimants sometimes seek rectifications that do contain apologies, 
and in a few of these cases the court actually awarded that request. The cases to 
be discussed next will illustrate that Dutch case law differs on the issue whether 
apologies can be awarded. 
In 1996, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal gave judgment in a case between labour 
unions and employers’ organizations. The lower court had ordered rectification 
of an article in which the labour unions had exaggerated certain differences of 
opinions about the new collective labour agreement. The ordered text of this 
rectification did not contain apologies, but it did contain an opinion. The labour 
unions were, among other things, ordered to publicly change their opinion about the 
statement that employers are planning to fire occupationally disabled employees. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision: according to the Court, 
a rectification order was a suitable remedy to prevent damage. However, it also 
took the view that the ordered text of the rectification, especially the part where 
the labour unions were ordered to express an opinion, was contrary to the right 
to freedom of expression. According to the Court of Appeal, an order to express 
an opinion amounts to the infringement of a further-reaching fundamental right, 
namely the negative right to freedom of expression. The Court determined that 
nobody may under any circumstances ever be forced by a judge to orally or in 
writing express an opinion that is not its own.53  
In 2008, The Amsterdam Court of Appeal confirmed this earlier decision. The 
Court refused a request for publication of a rectification containing apologies 
52 Akkermans et al, above n 23, 782.
53 Court of  Appeal of Amsterdam, 23 May 1996, Mediaforum 1996-7/8, B99.  
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in a company’s magazine. An employee who was wrongly accused of stealing 
a colleague’s boots had sought vindication, as well as apologies. Since it had 
decided to refuse the rectification, the Court of Appeal didn’t have to decide about 
the sought apologies. However, it explicitly added that it wouldn’t have ordered 
the company to publish apologies in any case, since compelled apologies would 
be an infringement of the right to freedom of expression.54          
In 2013, a District court had to decide about a request for the publication of a 
rectification of untrue statements, containing apologies. A regional radio and 
television station broadcasted a commentary on “Addictioncare”, a corporation 
for care and treatment of drug addicts. Addictioncare was of the opinion that 
in this commentary, the radio/television station had published incorrect and 
misleading information about the corporation and had falsely accused it of fraud. 
The court determined that the radio/television station had indeed acted unlawfully 
against Addictioncare. Although it awarded the requested rectification, the court 
turned down the request for apologies, stating that people should offer apologies 
in the conviction they did something wrong. The court concluded there was no 
indication for this, and added the defendant just had to publish a rectification 
because the court ordered him to do so.55
However, in a few cases, District courts did order defendants to publish a 
rectification containing apologies. Recently, in a copyright infringement case 
where the plaintiff also complained about false allegations on the defendant’s 
website, the District court ordered the defendant to publish a rectification on 
their Twitter-account, Facebook-page and LinkedIn-page. The publication was 
to read as follows: ‘We were wrong. [X] does NOT offer unauthorized copies of 
[Y]-products. We apologize to [X].’56 The court considered that the defendant’s 
allegations were untruthful and defamatory and that an infringement of their right 
to freedom of expression was compatible with Article 10 of the Convention. It 
is remarkable that the plaintiff in this case had indeed claimed the publication 
of a rectification, but they had not explicitly added a request for apologies. 
Moreover, the court did make clear why it ordered the defendant to publish a 
rectification, but it did not explain why it added apologies to the cited text. Also 
in other defamation cases, the motives for the District court’s decision to order an 
apology – in contrast to its decision to order a rectification – were not explicitly 
addressed.57  
The above shows that Dutch courts have different opinions about the relation 
between apologies and the right to freedom of expression. Perhaps it should be 
noted here that civil law jurisdictions have no formal rule equivalent to the common 
54 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 19 June 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BE9682. 
55 Court of Oost-Brabant, 11 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2013:2856. 
56 Court of Midden-Nederland, 18 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2014:2472.
57 See, eg, Court of Haarlem, 1 November 20006, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2006:AZ1366; Court 
of The Hague, 17 October 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BB5893; Court of The Hague, 20 
August 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BB2188. 
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law doctrine of stare decisis. The consequences of this doctrinal difference are 
however easily overestimated. Even without stare decisis it is generally common 
wisdom not to judge contrary to higher courts decisions, as this can only lead to 
successful appeals. For courts in civil law jurisdictions it is no less core business 
to analyze other cases and follow the judgments of others, especially those of 
higher courts.58 The art of distinguishing is very much the same. But of course 
it can happen that (lower) courts appear to hold different opinions, especially on 
issues that have not yet been fully articulated and that lack an explicit decision 
of the Supreme Court. In regard of the relation between compelled apologies and 
the right to freedom of expression, most Dutch courts seem to be of the opinion 
that court-ordered apologies are an undue restriction of the right to freedom of 
expression. Only a few courts determined differently. However, as mentioned 
above, Article 10 of the Convention does not guarantee a wholly unrestricted right 
to freedom of expression. Like most provisions of this kind, Article 10 (2) permits 
restrictions, as long as these restrictions are prescribed by law and ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’. The right to freedom of expression may for example under 
certain circumstances be restricted to protect the health, reputation or rights of 
others. 
 
(b) Compelled Apologies, Freedom of Expression and the European Court 
of Human Rights
In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), several rulings 
can be found that concern the relation between the right to freedom of expression 
and compelled apologies. Claims to receive an apology have been awarded in 
several contracting states, such as Slovakia, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Poland.59 
In none of the cases brought before the ECHR, the court has taken the position 
that the national courts’ authority to grant an order to apologise as such constituted 
a breach of the right to freedom of expression. The ECHR considered that the 
national court’s decision constituted an interference with the right to freedom of 
expression, and subsequently examined whether that interference was justified 
under Article 10 (2) of the Convention. The ECHR considers compelled apologies 
to be a restriction of the right of freedom of expression that can be permitted 
provided that the interference with this right is prescribed by law and ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’.60 
58 Zweigert and Kötz, above n 13, 262. 
59 See, eg, Slovakia: Radio Twist AS v Slovakia (European Court of Human Rights, Fifth 
Section, Application No 62202/00, 19 December 2006); Russia: Kazakov v Russia 
(European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 1758/02, 18 December 
2008); Turkey: Cihan Ozturk v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Second Section, 
Application No 17095/03, 9 June 2009); Ukraine: Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo v 
Ukraine (European Court of Human Rights, Fifth Section, Application No 33014/05, 5 
May 2011); Poland: Kania v Poland (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, 
Application No 35105/04, 21 June 2011).
60 See, eg, Ovchinnikov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application 
No 24061/04, 16 December 2010); Kania v Poland (European Court of Human Rights, 
Fourth Section, Application No 35105/04, 21 June 2011); Blaja News v Poland (European 
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An interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ provided that the interference 
corresponds to ‘a pressing social need’, that it is ‘proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued’ and that ‘the reasons given by the national authorities to justify the 
actual measures of “interference” they take are relevant and sufficient’.61 National 
authorities have a certain “margin of appreciation” in assessing whether an 
interference is necessary, but the ECHR is authorised to give the final ruling. It is 
the ECHR’s task to determine whether states exercise their discretion ‘reasonably, 
carefully and in good faith’. To this end it considers the interference in the light of 
the case concerned as a whole.62 
Interesting for our present inquiry is the case of Kazakov v Russia of 18 December 
2008.63 In this case, the ECHR determined that compelled apologies are ‘a 
doubtful form of redress’.64 A commander of a military unit, who received a letter 
of a defamatory nature from a former military officer, lodged a defamation action 
claiming that the letter concerned had impaired his honour and dignity. He sought 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage and a written apology. Both claims were 
sustained by the national court. The former military officer who wrote the letter 
complained under Article 10 of the Convention ‘that the domestic courts had 
forced him to change his opinion by ordering him to make written apologies’. 
The ECHR set out to determine whether the interference in this case, which was 
‘prescribed by law’, was also ‘necessary in a democratic society’. It concluded: 
‘the Court notes that the applicant was ordered to issue an apology. In its view, to 
make someone retract his or her own opinion by acknowledging his or her own 
wrongness is a doubtful form of redress and does not appear to be “necessary”’65 
The ECHR declared the former military officer’s complaint admissible and held 
that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.66   
The phrasing of this conclusion seems to suggest that the ECHR is making a 
general statement about ordering apologies, and not a consideration in regard 
to this specific case. In subsequent judgments though, the ECHR seems to 
have abandoned this position.67 The cases to be discussed next will support this 
observation. 
Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 59545/10, 26 November 2013).
61 See, eg, Handyside v The United Kingdom, (European Court of Human Rights, Application 
No 5493/72, 7 December 1973) [48]-[50].  
62 See, eg, The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, (European Court of Human Rights, 
Application No 6538/74, 26 April 1979) [59]. 
63 Kazakov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 
1758/02, 18 December 2008).
64 Ibid [30].
65 Ibid [30].
66 Ibid (Court’s decision).
67 See, eg, Ovchinnikov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application 
No 24061/04, 16 December 2010); Kittel v Poland (European Court of Human Rights, 
Fourth Section, Application No 35105/04, 21 June 2011); Blaja News v Poland (European 
Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 59545/10, 26 November 2013).
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In the case of Cihan Ozturk v Turkey of 9 June 2009, the ECHR implicitly confirmed 
that compelled apologies can be a permitted restriction of the right to freedom 
of expression and that compelled apologies can, under certain circumstances, be 
more appropriate than other sanctions.68 The applicant in this case, a post office 
manager in Beyoğlu, Istanbul, had written an article in which he criticized the 
former Director of the Istanbul State postal service. He criticized the former 
Director’s ‘negligence in the project to restore the Beyoğlu post office building 
and blamed her for the dilapidated stand and partial collapse of the building’. The 
article was published in the State postal service magazine. The former Director 
brought a civil action for compensation against the applicant and the editor-in-
chief of the magazine before the Istanbul Civil Court of First Instance. This court 
awarded the former Director a financial compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 
The Court of Cassation upheld this judgment. The ECHR noted that the judgment 
constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, 
which was ‘prescribed by law’. It needed to determine whether the interference 
was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The ECHR observed that defamation 
laws or proceedings, which in fact prevent legitimate criticism of public officials, 
cannot be justified. In this case, according to the ECHR, the imposed sanction was 
significant; it could deter others from criticizing public officials. The ECHR found 
that the national authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant 
interests in this case, and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 
of the Convention. The most interesting part of the case for our present inquiry 
however, is the fact that the ECHR suggested that the national courts, instead 
of awarding financial compensation for non-pecuniary damage, might have 
considered other sanctions, ‘such as the issuance of an apology’.69 
Furthermore, in the case of Aleksey Ovchinnikov v Russia of 16 December 2010, 
the order to publish a retraction containing an apology was found ‘prescribed 
by law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’.70 The son of two federal judges 
and the step grandson of the deputy head of the Ivanovo Regional Traffic Police, 
both twelve years of age, committed violent and sexual acts against a nine-year-
old boy. Evidence was found, but because of the minor age of the offenders, the 
offences were not prosecutable. The media took interest in the case and multiple 
newspaper articles were published.71 The offender’s parents and step grandfather 
brought a civil action for defamation and disclosure of private information 
and sought retraction. The Sovetskiy District Court granted their requests for a 
retraction because the journalists who had published the articles had failed to 
prove the allegation that the parents and the step grandfather had interfered 
with the investigation, as Article 152 of the Russian Civil Code required. The 
newspaper and the applicant (a journalist) were ordered to publish retractions 
68 Ozturk v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Second Section, Application No 
17095/03, 9 June 2009).
69 Ibid [33].
70 Ovchinnikov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 
24061/04, 16 December 2010).
71 Ibid [6]-[12].
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containing an apology to both families.72 The Ivanovo Regional Court upheld 
both judgments. The journalist complained with the ECHR of a violation of his 
right to freedom of expression. He submitted: 
that the order to publish a retraction containing an apology had had no 
basis in domestic law. He argued that only a voluntary apology might 
be acceptable under the Convention. It was clearly excessive to compel 
someone to make an apology, thereby forcing him to express an opinion 
that did not correspond to his personal convictions.73
Explaining the relevant domestic law, the ECHR referred to Resolution no. 3, 
which was adopted by the Plenary Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in 
2005. This Resolution prohibited the national courts from ordering defendants 
to apologise, because this form of redress did not have a basis under Russian 
Law.74 However, the ECHR recognised this to be different before the adoption of 
the Resolution. Since the national court gave judgments before 2005, the ECHR 
concluded that the interference in this case was indeed ‘prescribed by law’.75 
Moreover, it declared that the interference could be considered ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ and consequently, there had been no violation of Article 10 
of the Convention.76 
Interesting to mention is Judge Kovler’s concurring opinion in this case. Although 
he finds no violation of Article 10 as well, he adds the following: ‘the Court has 
already found that “an apology” cannot be considered “necessary” under Article 
10 (…); thus, the domestic courts overstepped to a certain extent the narrow 
margin of appreciation afforded to them for restrictions on debates of public 
interest.’77 He nonetheless swayed his position to finding no violation of Article 
10, ‘only’ because of the fact that Resolution no. 3 was adopted after the national 
court’s judgments.78 
Despite the case of Kazakov v Russia79 and the opinion of Judge Kovler in 
the case of Aleksey Ovchinnikov v Russia80, it appears that the ECHR is of the 
opinion that compelled apologies can, under the appropriate circumstances, be 
a permitted restriction of the right to freedom of expression.81 The ECHR also 
72 Ibid [13]-[4] [17]-[8].
73 Ibid [37].
74 Ibid [32].
75 Ibid [45].
76 Ibid [56]-[7]. 
77 Ibid (Concurring Opinion of Judge Kovler). 
78 Ibid.
79 Kazakov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 
1758/02, 18 December 2008). 
80 Ovchinnikov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 
24061/04, 16 December 2010). (Concurring Opinion of Judge Kovler).
81 See, eg, Kania v Poland (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application 
No 35105/04, 21 June 2011); Blaja News v Poland (European Court of Human Rights, 
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seems to think that under certain circumstances, compelled apologies could even 
be more appropriate than other sanctions.82 Hence, it can be argued that the right 
to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 (1) of the Convention can be 
restricted to meet a justified desire to receive apologies in order to protect the 
rights of others.83 
(c) Infringement of the Right to Freedom of Expression in Personal  
 Injury Cases
 
It should be kept in mind that the above-mentioned cases of the ECHR and of the 
Dutch Courts all originated in defamation proceedings. Infringements of the right 
to freedom of expression in the form of an order to offer apologies were accepted 
to protect for example the privacy or the reputation of others. The question 
remains as to whether the right to freedom of expression may also be restricted 
to accommodate the desire to receive apologies in cases of a different kind, for 
instance to benefit a person’s emotional recovery from injury. In the Netherlands, 
as far as we are aware, no personal injury victim has as yet asked for an apology 
in court. Apologies have been claimed in a few civil cases, but as in the above-
mentioned cases of the Dutch Courts, these were all defamation proceedings in 
which the claimant not only requested apologies, but also demanded rectification. 
In cases where the claimant was successful and rectification was ordered, the 
defendant was, generally (except for a few cases), not forced to incorporate 
an apology in this rectification. The court’s decision not to order an apology is 
usually motivated in just a few general terms. The opinion of most courts seems 
to be that apologies cannot be compelled, are not enforceable, or that enforcing 
apologies would not have any added value.84 In a few defamation cases, the court 
has explicitly stated that there is no legal ground for court-ordered apologies 
in Dutch law.85 In other cases, as discussed above, courts have ruled that court-
imposed apologies are contrary to the freedom of expression.86
Although in the Netherlands, apologies have been (as far as we are aware) only 
requested in defamation proceedings, it seems perfectly conceivable that an order 
to offer apologies will sooner or later be sought for in a personal injury case. 
Fourth Section, Application No 59545/10, 26 November 2013).
82 Ozturk v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Second Section, Application No 
17095/03, 9 June 2009) [33].
83 See Ovchinnikov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application 
No 24061/04, 16 December 2010). See also, eg, Kania v Poland (European Court of 
Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 35105/04, 21 June 2011); Blaja News v 
Poland (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 59545/10, 26 
November 2013).
84 See, eg, District Court of Leeuwarden, 14 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2011:BT2357; 
District Court of Leeuwarden, 18 August 2010, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2010:BN6111; District 
Court of Amsterdam, 7 August 2008, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2008:BD9783.
85 See, eg, District Court of Leeuwarden, 31 August 2010, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2010:BN6133; 
District Court of Amsterdam, 30 June 2010, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2010:BO1998.
86 See, eg, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 19 June 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BE9682; 
Court of Rotterdam, 21 November 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BY4993. 
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Empirical research shows that apologies are important and valuable to victims.87 
The victim’s recovery could be hampered or the physical and psychological 
consequences of the incident may be exacerbated, should their non-pecuniary needs 
be ignored.88 As recovery takes precedence over compensation, the availability 
of effective remedies seems essential. It might be argued that preventing or 
mitigating (further) damage and providing an adequate compensation, for example 
in the form of compelled apologies, could justify an infringement of the freedom 
of expression. A judgment of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the “HIV 
case”89 might illustrate that restriction of a defendant’s fundamental rights may, in 
certain circumstances, be justified to protect the plaintiff’s rights. 
In this case, the non-pecuniary needs of a rape victim were at issue. The victim 
demanded that her rapist would be ordered to undergo an HIV-test. Several months 
after the rape, the victim herself had her own blood tested for HIV and the results 
were negative. The victim was told to repeat the test after 6 months to rule out 
HIV infection. Yet, the victim claimed to be emotionally incapable of undergoing 
a second test. She claimed the rapist should undergo an HIV test instead. In case 
the test was negative, the victim was assured of not being infected with the HIV 
virus. The claimant based her claim on multiple legal grounds. The first two of 
these legal grounds were the obligation to “pay” non-pecuniary compensation 
and the obligation to mitigate damage. With regard to these grounds, the Supreme 
Court judged it was the claimant’s right that the consequences of the rape should 
either be mitigated by the defendant, or be counterbalanced with an appropriate 
form of compensation. The defendant argued that a mandatory blood test would 
be an infringement of his fundamental right to physical integrity. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court judged that a restriction to the defendant’s right to physical 
integrity was allowed in this specific situation. It was imperative for the victim 
that one of the most severe consequences of the rape – uncertainty about a 
possible HIV infection – would be removed. On the ground of the duty of care of 
tort law, the Supreme Court believed the defendant was required either to mitigate 
the claimant’s damage, or to counterbalance the consequences of the rape with 
an appropriate form of compensation. This meant specifically that the defendant 
was obliged to end the victim’s uncertainty about a possible HIV infection by 
undergoing a blood test and, as a consequence thereof, to tolerate the infringement 
of his fundamental right to physical integrity.90
87 See, eg, R M E Huver et al, Slachtoffers en Aansprakelijkheid. Een Onderzoek naar 
Behoeften, Verwachtingen en Ervaringen van Slachtoffers en hun Naasten met Betrekking 
tot het Civiele Aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Deel I, Terreinverkenning [Victims and Liability. 
Research Aimed to Gain Insight into the Needs, Expectations, and Experiences of Victims, 
their Relatives, and Bereaved with Respect to Liability Law. Part I, Exploration], Den 
Haag: WODC 2007.
88 See above Section II(B)(3)(b). 
89 Dutch Supreme Court, 18 June 1993, RvdW 136.
90 Ibid.
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In cases involving, for example, medical malpractice or car accidents, apologies 
can meet important psychological needs of victims. Compelling a defendant to 
apologise entails a restriction of his right to freedom of expression. However, the 
HIV case can illustrate that restriction of a defendant’s fundamental rights may, 
in certain circumstances, be justified to protect the victim’s rights. With the HIV 
case in mind, it might be argued that preventing or mitigating (further) damage 
and providing an adequate compensation in the form of compelled apologies 
could justify an infringement of freedom of expression, as long as, of course, the 
interference is prescribed by law and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
IV  ARE COMPELLED APOLOGIES INSINCERE AND   
 THEREFORE NOT OF ANY VALUE? 
A second possible objection to enforcement of an apology order is that, if one 
considers a particular emotion, such as regret or sorrow, to be essential to an 
apology, it seems rather difficult to compel someone to apologise who does 
not actually feel that way. Suppose individual A is as a driver involved in a car 
accident with driver B. B is injured and holds A liable. He claims damages and 
apologies in court. Although the court judges A to be responsible for the cause and 
consequences of the car crash, A does not agree that he did something wrong and 
consequently refuses to apologise. In such a case one could doubt whether it is at 
all possible to achieve a meaningful apology. One can bring a horse to the water, 
but one cannot make it drink. 
Carroll refers to the Hong Kong Ma Bik Yung case.91 In this case, the Court of 
Final Appeal actually did hold that the Court had the statutory power to make 
an apology order, even against a defendant ‘who does not feel sorry’92, but 
it concluded that to make such an order, the circumstances would have to be 
‘exceptional’.93 
In regard of this second objection against ordered apologies one can distinguish 
two related issues: (1) the assumption that compelled apologies are, unlike 
voluntary apologies, insincere and (2) given that a court cannot order sincerity: 
the question whether insincere apologies could have any value. 
As mentioned above, some Australian courts have concluded that ordering an 
apology that is not offered voluntarily ‘will be insincere and meaningless and 
therefore futile’.94 Although voluntary apologies are indeed more likely to be 
sincere than compelled apologies, it is not necessarily true that ordered apologies 
91 [2002] 2 HKLRD 1 (Ma Bik Yung v Ko Chuen). See Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, 
above n 4, 328.
92 [2002] 2 HKLRD 1, 11.
93 Ibid 19.
94 Carroll and Witzleb, above n 18, 232. Carroll and Witzleb refer to Evans v National Crime 
Authority [2003] FMCA 375, [115]; Jones v Toben (2002) 71 ALD 629, [106], citing 
Hely’s decision in Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243, [245]. 
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are never sincere. In her article on court-ordered apologies, Carroll shows this 
to be not so black-and-white.95 She describes some grey, but plausible situations 
in which a victim could receive an obligatory, but, to a certain extent, still 
sincere apology. For example, it is conceivable that a defendant is unwilling to 
acknowledge  a mistake, but is prepared to sincerely apologise once the court 
orders him to do so.96
Nevertheless, an apology that is not offered voluntarily will typically be less 
than sincere. However, apologies do not necessarily need to be sincere in order 
to be effective.97 Empirical research suggests that compelled apologies or even 
insincere apologies could still be effective and valuable to claimants.98 Sincerity 
of an apology seems most important when offered in private situations, since 
personal apologies are meant to re-establish a damaged relationship. By offering 
apologies, one secures the forgiveness of the other party. It means the acceptance 
of the rules of social behaviour and willingness to conform to those rules in the 
future.99 
Mandatory offered apologies by, for instance, public authorities or health care 
professionals, are often a reaction to incidents that affect all of society, even 
when the incident itself involves only one or just a few individual victims. In 
those situations, apologies are usually expressed publicly instead of privately. 
For example, a few months after his term of prime minister of Ukraine, Viktor 
Yanukovych was ordered to apologise publicly to a man whom he had insulted 
by using an obscenity.100 Acknowledgement of the violation of a social or moral 
contract is significant in those cases, and sincerity of the apology is of marginal 
importance.101 
This is consistent with the situation in Australia where apology orders are 
available as a remedy in anti-discrimination cases.102 Carroll notes that in many 
Australian cases the courts have not expressed any view about the value of such 
an apology to the claimant concerning.103 She describes a distinction between 
95 Robyn Carroll, ‘You Can’t Order Sorriness, So Is There Any Value in an Ordered Apology? 
An Analysis of Ordered Apologies in Anti-Discrimination Cases’, (2010) 33 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, 360, 373.
96 Ibid 372.
97 Aaron Lazare, ‘On Apology’, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 117.
98 Jane L Risen and Thomas Gilovich, ‘Target and Observer Differences in the Acceptance 
of Questionable Apologies’, (2007) 92 Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 418; 
Mark Bennett and Christopher Dewberry, ‘I’ve said I’m sorry, haven’t I?’A Study of the 
Identity Implications and Constraints that Apologies Create for Their Recipients, (1994) 13 
Current Psychology, 10, 19. 
99 Lazare, above n 97, 229-31; Michael Alberstein and Nadav Davidovich, ‘Apologies in 
the Healthcare System: From Clinical Medicine to Public Health’, (2011) 74 Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 150, 158.  
100 Brutti, above n 2, 133. 
101 Lazare, above n 97, 118.
102 Carroll, You Can’t Order Sorriness, above n 95, 362.
103 Ibid 374-5.
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personal apologies on the one hand, and apologies made for the purpose of 
fulfilling a legal requirement on the other.104 In the Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney 
Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) case,105 ordered apologies are characterized as such a legal 
requirement. In this case, apologies were ordered ‘to satisfy the objectives of 
the legislation rather than as an apology as commonly understood.’106 In such 
circumstances ordered apologies are clearly considered valuable regardless of the 
question of sincerity. Furthermore, Australian courts take into account the benefits 
of an apology order to the community in addition to the benefits to the claimant. 
Court-ordered apologies could for example have symbolic and educative value.107
Hence, compelled apologies are not necessarily insincere, and insincere apologies 
could still be valuable. On this account, a claimant’s demand for apologies should 
not be rejected on the assumption that compelled apologies are insincere and 
therefore not of any value. When someone seeks an ordered apology, it is obvious 
that he also regards an involuntary and insincere apology as having value.108 
V  MODALITY OF THE JUDGMENT
As argued above, there are several possible legal grounds upon which apologies 
could be claimed in the Netherlands. Enforcement is problematic because of 
the ensuing infringement of the fundamental fight to freedom of expression, but 
may under certain circumstances be justified in order to protect the rights of the 
claimant. It has also been submitted that compelled apologies can be valuable 
to victims, and that an ordered apology it is not necessarily insincere. Thus, in 
theory, it is very well conceivable that a claim to offer apologies may, under 
certain circumstances, be awarded.
At this point it seems to be important to realise that, as is the case in regard 
of the sincerity of compelled apologies, also the issue of enforcement is not 
necessarily a matter of black-and-white. Creativity on the side of the claimant 
in the formulation of his claim, as well as the discretion of the court to frame its 
exact ruling, allow for several ‘grey’ solutions, at least according to Dutch civil 
procedural law.109 
To diminish the interference of the freedom of speech, a court could for example 
order the defendant to express apologies in words of their own choosing. Another 
option is the mere declaration that the defendant should apologise, without making 
available the usual sanction of a monetary sum to be paid upon non-performance. 
It is after all not the verdict that a defendant should offer an apology that constitutes 
an infringement of his right to freedom of speech, but being actually compelled 
104 Ibid 362-3; Carroll, The Ordered ‘Apology’ as a Remedy, above n 3, 418. 
105 [2005], NSWADT 24.
106 Carroll, The Ordered ‘Apology’ as a Remedy, above n 3, 418.
107 Ibid 384.
108 Carroll and Witzleb, above n 18, 233. 
109 Akkermans et al, above n 23, 784.
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to do so. It should be mentioned here that civil law jurisdictions generally are 
unfamiliar with the concept of contempt of court. It seems a reasonable assumption 
that many public and private institutions, but many private persons also, will be 
prepared to offer apologies so far refused, once a court of law has decided that 
they should do so, even when no coercive sanctions have been made available to 
the claimant. Another modality is when courts ‘reward’ someone who apologises. 
In a few Dutch civil cases, the court lowered the amount of damages because the 
defendant had apologised.110 All these modalities can address the importance of 
apologies for claimants and constitute an incentive to defendants to actually make 
them. 
VI  CONCLUSION
In both Australia and the Netherlands, there is an increasing awareness that 
apologies and other non-pecuniary interests can be of great importance to plaintiffs 
who suffered a wrong. In the Netherlands, efforts have been made in recent years 
to encourage health care professionals and public authorities to offer apologies in 
an appropriate way following mistakes. Failing to offer apologies for a wrongful 
decision or act by public authorities might be a breach of the principle of sound 
administration and health care professionals who fail to be open and apologise 
to patients may be disciplined for misconduct by disciplinary tribunals. Yet in 
contrast to Australia, there are no statutes providing for court ordered apologies. 
Although apologies are not explicitly included as a specific remedy in the Dutch 
Civil Code, it is argued in this article that there are still several possible legal 
grounds upon which apologies could be claimed. It is not the acceptance of the 
obligation to offer apologies as such that remains problematic, but much more 
the enforcement thereof. If a defendant is (persistently) not willing to voluntarily 
apologise, a court order to offer an apology seems problematic, not primarily 
because compelled apologies are insincere (it has been argued that also insincere 
apologies could still be valuable for the claimant), but because compelling a 
defendant to offer apologies constitutes to an infringement of his fundamental 
right to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 (1) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. The case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights seems to indicate that the ECHR is of the opinion that compelled apologies 
can be a permitted restriction of the right to freedom of expression. The ECHR 
even seems to think that under certain circumstances, compelled apologies could 
be more appropriate than other sanctions. 
Given the above, it is conceivable that a claim to offer apologies may, under 
certain circumstances, be awarded by the Dutch courts, not only in defamation 
proceedings, but also in cases of a different kind, such as personal injury cases. It 
seems only a matter of time until some claimant will give it a try.
110 See, eg, Court of The Hague, 12 December 2001, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2001:AD7073; Court 
of Amsterdam, 20 July 2011,  ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2011:BR6128.
